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THE HARD LOOK DOCTRINE:
HOW DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY CAN INFORM
AGENCIES ON PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF NEPA
REGULATIONS
Monica Mercola*
“Many workers in the petrochemical plants . . . felt caught in a
terrible bind. They loved their magnificent wilderness. They
remembered it as children. They knew it and respect it as sportsmen.
But their jobs were in industries that polluted—often legally—this
same wilderness.”
1
INTRODUCTION
Executive Order 12898—Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income
Populations—was issued to achieve “environmental protection for
all communities”
2
by drawing federal attention to the environmental
and human health effects brought about by federal agencies.
3
The
Executive Order instructs that:
* J.D. Candidate 2020, Brooklyn Law School; B.S. in Philosophy, Northeastern
University, 2015. Thank you to my friends and family that have helped and
supported me throughout law school and the note writing process. Additionally,
thank you to the Journal of Law and Policymembers for all their assistance in the
creation of this Note.
1
ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER
ANDMOURNING ON THEAMERICAN RIGHT 51 (2016).
2
Summary of Executive Order 12898 – Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-
executive-order-12898-federal-actions-address-environmental-justice (last
updated Sept. 17, 2018).
3
Federal agency means all agencies of the Federal Government.
It does not mean the Congress, the Judiciary, or the President,
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[t]o the greatest extent practicable and permitted by
law, and consistent with the principles set forth in the
report on the National Performance Review, each
Federal agency shall make achieving environmental
justice part of its mission by identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high
and adverse human health or environmental effects
of its programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations.
4
In addition to the call to identify and address disproportionate effects
on these communities, the executive order directed each agency to
implement a strategy of environmental justice and establish an
InteragencyWorking Group on environmental justice chaired by the
Environmental Protection Agency Administrator.
5
Executive Order 12898 recognized that low-income and
minority communities often do not have access to the same
environmental standards as those living in wealthy or majority-
white communities and are disproportionately affected by the
negative impacts of federal programs, policies, and activities.
6
Low-
income communities are comparatively below-standard in areas that
include, but are not limited to, access to clean drinking water, clean
air, adequate living conditions, and better health and overall safety.
7
including the performance of staff functions for the President in
his Executive Office. It also includes for purposes of these
regulations States and units of general local government and
Indian tribes assuming NEPA responsibilities under section
104(h) of the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974.
Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.12 (2018).
4
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994),
amended by Exec. Order No. 12,948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381 (1995).
5
Summary of Executive Order 12898 – Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations,
supra note 2.
6
See supra text accompanying note 4.
7
See Jasmine Bell, 5 Things to Know About Communities of Color and
Environmental Justice, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 25, 2016),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2016/04/25/136361/5-
things-to-know-about-communities-of-color-and-environmental-justice/.
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Minority and low-income communities often face decades of
disinvestment, both intentionally and unintentionally through local,
state, and federal land-use policies.
8
As a result, these communities
have limited access to these environmental standards.
9
However, the
executive order’s direction that federal agencies “identify[] and
address[] . . . disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of [their] programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low-income populations” is not a
mandate.
10
Presently, several statutes and constitutional
amendments are available to address environmental justice
concerns, such as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
11
the Fair Housing
Act (“FHA”),
12
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
8
Renee Skelton & Vernice Miller, The Environmental Justice Movement,
NAT’L RESOURCE DEF. COUNCIL (Mar. 17, 2016),
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/environmental-justice-movement.
9
See Ben Kesslen, Heat Waves Fall Hardest on Poor and Elderly, Experts
Say, NAT’L BROADCASTING COMPANY NEWS (July 20, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/heat-waves-fall-hardest-poor-elderly-
experts-say-n1031871.
10
See supra text accompanying note 4.
11
Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in
programs or activities which receive federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (2017); Anyone can file a discrimination complaint with the EPA’s
External Civil Rights Compliance Office, formerly known as the Office of Civil
Rights. External Civil Rights Compliance Office (Title VI), ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ogc/external-civil-rights-compliance-office-title-
vi (last updated Apr. 22, 2019). However, the Commission of Civil Rights found
that “the Office has not adequately adjudicated Title VI complaints” and that it
has “lost sight of its mission and priorities.” EVALUATION OF THE EPAOFFICE OF
CIVIL RIGHTS, DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP 1–2 (2011),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/723416/epa-ocr-audit.pdf.
12
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act (the Fair Housing Act) prohibits
discrimination by public and private actors and requires that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development “affirmatively further fair housing in all federal
programs.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3608 (2017). However, courts recently interpreted
the FHA to “apply only to discrimination that occurs in connection with the initial
sale or rental of a dwelling.” Benjamin A. Schepis,Making the Fair Housing Act
More Fair: Permitting Section 3604(b) to Provide Relief for Post-Occupancy
Discrimination in the Provision of Municipal Services—A Historical View, 41 U.
TOL. L. REV. 411, 411 (2010).
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Amendment.
13
However, these efforts have generally failed the
intended goal of achieving environmental justice,
14
in part because
environmental law tends to look at an agency’s procedure in making
an environmental determination
15
while civil rights law tends to
look at the substance of the issue at hand,
16
thwarting the
compatibility of the two regimes.
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
17
is the
United States’ foundational federal environmental law
18
that, in
relevant part, aims to guide agencies in making informed decisions
regarding environmental matters by “ensur[ing] that [each] agency,
in reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully
consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental
impacts.”
19
Before NEPA, however, federal agencies were not
13
The Equal Protection Clause requires that the government not “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. However, proving discriminatory intent is particularly
challenging in environmental justice cases because, in most cases, discriminatory
intent is not present. Wyatt G. Sassman, Environmental Justice as Civil Rights,
18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 441, 451 (2015).
14
Id. at 442.
15
See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227–28 (1980) (“[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s
procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to [e]nsure that the agency
has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject itself within
the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.’”
(quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976))).
16
Proving discrimination often requires courts to look at the substantive
definition of discrimination. SeeMelissa Hart, Disparate Impact Discrimination:
The Limits of Litigation, the Possibilities for Internal Compliance, 33 J.C. &U.L.
547, 551 (2007).
17
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2017).
18
NEPA is often called the “Magna Carta” of federal environmental laws
because, like the Magna Carta’s intent to protect against monarchical rule, NEPA
is intended to render federal projects transparent. Amanda Jahshan, NEPA: The
Magna Carta of Environmental Law, NRDC (Jul. 26, 2013),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/amanda-jahshan/nepa-magna-carta-environmental-
law. NEPA requires federal agencies “to assess the environmental effects of their
proposed actions prior to making decisions.” National Environmental Policy Act:
Welcome, DEP’T ENERGY, https://ceq.doe.gov/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2019)
[hereinafter NEPA: Welcome].
19
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349–50
(1989); Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b)–(c) (2018).
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required to consider environmental issues—instead, Congress
directed federal agencies to conduct “mission” programs to achieve
legislative objectives, regardless of their effect on the
environment.
20
Under NEPA, when federal agencies develop proposals to take
a major federal action,
21
an environmental review must be
conducted, which may consist of three different levels of analysis:
(1) a categorical exclusion determination, (2) an environmental
assessment (“EA”) or finding of no significant impact, and (3) an
environmental impact statement (“EIS”).
22
A categorical exclusion
determination refers to a major federal action which “may be
‘categorically excluded’ from a detailed environmental analysis if
the federal action does not[] ‘individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment.’”
23
If a categorical
exclusion does not apply to a proposed action, an agency then may
prepare an EA to determine “whether or not a federal action has the
potential to cause significant environmental effects.”
24
An EA
includes, among other topics, a brief discussion of the
environmental impacts of the proposed action.
25
If the EA indicates
that no significant impact is likely to result from the proposed action,
the agency may take the proposed action after releasing a finding of
no significant impact (“FONSI”). Only when the EA determines that
the proposal will significantly affect the quality of the human
20
DANIELR.MANDELKER ET. AL., NEPALAW AND LITIGATION 2–4 (2019).
21
A major federal action is one that significantly affects the environment. §
1508.18. This can be either a direct action such as construction or an indirect
action such as permitting. Id.
22
National Environmental Policy Act Review Process, ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-
process#main-content (last visited Aug. 26, 2019) [hereinafter NEPA Review
Process] (summarizing the NEPA review process); see § 1508.18.
23
NEPA Review Process supra note 22 (quoting § 1508.4).
24
Id.
25
Id.
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environment
26
will the agency intending to act prepare an EIS.
27
An
EIS is a detailed document with more rigorous requirements than
those for an EA: agencies must explain their purpose and need for
the proposed action, provide potential alternatives, describe the
environment of the area to be affected by the available alternatives,
and include a discussion of the proposed action’s direct and indirect
environmental effects and their respective significances.
28
NEPA does not impose any substantive requirements on federal
agencies.
29
Instead, it simply exists to ensure a process, aiming to
make sure that each agency will have available, and will consider, a
carefully detailed compilation of information concerning significant
environmental impacts.
30
It ensures that the information will then be
made available to the public.
31
After an agency issues a final EIS,
environmental and other citizen organizations can attempt to delay
or end the project by challenging the agency’s EIS process.
32
The
26
Id.; In the NEPA context, whether a proposal “significantly” affects the
quality of the human environment requires a consideration of both “context and
intensity” of such proposal, where context looks at the effects on society as a
whole, while intensity looks at the severity of the impact. § 1508.27. The human
environment includes “the natural and physical environment and the relationship
of people with that environment.” § 1508.14. See also Ocean Advocates v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d 846, 86 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that an agency
can consider factors to help understand the significance of a project, which include
“the unique characteristics of the geographic area[;] . . . whether the action bears
some relationship to other actions with individually insignificant but cumulatively
significant impacts; the level of uncertainty of the risk and to what degree it
involves unique or unknown risks; and whether the action threatens violation of
an environmental law.”).
27
NEPA Review Process, supra note 22.
28
§ 1502.1; see also NEPA Review Process, supra note 22 (summarizing the
NEPA review process).
29
See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 333
(2019) (“[I]t is well settled that NEPA itself does not impose substantive duties
mandating particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process for
preventing uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.”).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
David J. Scriven-Young, Eighth Circuit Reaffirms That There Is No Right
of Action Under NEPA Prior to Final Agency Action, PECKAR&ABRAMSON, P.C.
(July 10, 2019), https://www.pecklaw.com/eighth-circuit-reaffirms-that-there-is-
no-right-of-action-under-nepa-prior-to-final-agency-action/.
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traditional remedy for plaintiffs in a NEPA case is a court-ordered
injunction.
33
Typically, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
must show that irreparable injury is likely unless an injunction is
granted.
34
The NEPA process encourages federal agencies to make
informed environmental decisions before a major federal project is
begun.
35
Yet the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”)
36
has
estimated that NEPA analyses conducted by federal agencies
produce a categorical exclusion an estimated 95% of the time, an
EA less than 5% of the time, and an EIS less than 1% of the time.
37
This indicates that, more often than not, agencies do not have to go
through the rigorous review requirements of an EIS.
38
The decision
not to conduct an EIS is reviewed in federal court under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
39
which provides that a
reviewing court may hold unlawful and set aside an agency action
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, otherwise
not in accordance with the law, or without observance of procedure
33
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155, 157 (2010).
34
Id. at 156–57.
35
NEPA: Welcome, supra note 18.
36
NEPA established the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) within the Executive Office of the President to ensure
that Federal agencies meet their obligations under NEPA. CEQ
oversees NEPA implementation, principally through issuing
guidance and interpreting regulations that implement NEPA’s
procedural requirements. CEQ also reviews and approves
Federal agency NEPA procedures, approves alternative
arrangements for compliance with NEPA for emergencies, and
helps to resolve disputes between Federal agencies and with
other governmental entities and members of the public.
Id.
37
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-370, NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: LITTLE INFORMATION EXISTS ON NEPA
ANALYSES 7–9 (2014).
38
Id.
39
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
THE HARD LOOK DOCTRINE 325
required by law.
40
The arbitrary and capricious standard of review
41
is considered appropriate when resolving factual disputes when
agencies have substantial expertise.
42
Courts review this standard
narrowly and may not substitute their own judgment for that of the
agency.
43
In reviewing an EIS, it is the challenger’s burden to prove
the agency’s decision is arbitrary and capricious.
44
Under NEPA, when preparing an EIS, an agency is “not required
to select the course of action that best serves environmental justice,
[but is] only [required] to take a ‘hard look’ at environmental justice
issues.”
45
The hard look doctrine is a principle of administrative
law
46
whereby courts must examine the methodology and substance
of agency decisions to ensure that they have adequate factual
support.
47
However, it is currently unclear how much data is enough
40
Id. (The reviewing court shall “(1) compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . [or] (D) without
observance of procedure required by law.”).
41
See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 966 F.2d
1292, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that under the arbitrary and capricious
standard of the APA, courts must find a “rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made” (quoting Sierra Pac. Indus. v. Lyng, 866 F.2d 1099,
1105 (9th Cir. 1989))).
42
See, e.g., Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376, 378 (1989);
Safari Aviation Inc. v. Garvey, 300 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002); Ninilchik
Traditional Council v. United States, 227 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2000).
43
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2001).
44
Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 960 (9th
Cir. 2005) (quoting California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982)).
45
Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1368
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Latin Ams. for Social & Econ. Dev. v. Fed. Highway
Admin., 756 F.3d 447, 475–77 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that the agency’s EIS was
sufficient because it discussed the intensity, extent, and duration of the
environmental effects of the proposed project on the environmental justice
communities, yet suggesting that had the agency completely refused to discuss
the demographics of the community, then the agency’s EIS would have been
deficient)).
46
The hard look test was first applied to environmental law by the D.C.
Circuit. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
47
Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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for a NEPA analysis; when an agency should collect more current,
or arguably more representative, information; or how an agency
should choose and apply appropriate methods and models for
evaluating environmental effects.
This Note will propose that, to ensure environmental justice, a
disparate impact analysis must be used by the courts instead of a
hard look test when evaluating an EIS to clarify four key factors: (1)
the data sufficiency; (2) data gaps; (3) stale data; and (4) the
scientific integrity of models and methodologies.
48
This Note begins
by introducing the concern that environmental issues
disproportionately affect low-income and minority communities,
yet environmental justice suits looking to remedy such disparate
impacts often fail. Part I examines the history of the hard look test
as it pertains to environmental law. Part II explains how the hard
look test has evolved to potentially create a “harder look” test but
posits that it is unclear whether the hard look test still offers a viable
way for courts to analyze environmental issues. Part III explains the
history of the disparate impact analysis, especially as it pertains to
environmental law. Part IV suggests that judges incorporate a
disparate impact analysis such that a modified harder look test is
created for reviewing EISs. Part V explains how this proposed
solution would not create a burdensome addition to the hard look
test for agencies because it comports with NEPA’s goal of requiring
deliberate agency decision-making. Finally, this Note concludes that
a disparate impact analysis should be incorporated into the hard look
test as it applies to environmental law to ensure that low-income and
minority communities will receive environmental justice.
I. HISTORY OF THEHARD LOOK TEST IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Generally, a federal agency’s decision to take an action with a
significant environmental impact is challenged on the grounds that
48
See generally MURRAY D. FELDMAN & KRISTIN A. NICHOLS, NEPA’S
SCIENTIFIC AND INFORMATION STANDARDS—TAKING THE HARDER LOOK
(ROCKY MT. MIN. L. FDN.) (2017),
https://www.hollandhart.com/files/66008_RMMLF-NEPA_s-Scientific-and-
Information-Standards--Taking.pdf (examining contemporary issues with data
sufficiency, data gaps, stale gaps, and existing methodologies).
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the EIS or its methodology was flawed.
49
When this occurs, courts
defer to the agency’s choice regarding the proper weight of scientific
information and impact assessment determinations, especially if the
subject is within the agency’s area of expertise.
50
The role of the
court is to ensure that a federal agency has thoroughly examined the
relevant factors and provided a reasonable explanation for its
actions.
51
The relevant factors a court must ensure an agency has
reviewed are whether the agency:
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.
52
Agencies show their review of these factors by considering
environmental issues such as noise impacts, visual impacts, or
functional impacts.
53
However, agencies are afforded broad
discretion when examining environmental facts and deciding
whether or not they are to be considered in making an EIS.
54
For a
court to review an agency’s decision, a court must “steep itself in
technical matters sufficiently to determine whether the agency has
exercised reasoned discretion.”
55
If it is found that an agency failed
to make “a rational connection between the facts found and the
49
See id. at 6- 5–6- 6.
50
See The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Lands Council asks this court to act as a panel of scientists that instructs the
Forest Service how to validate its hypotheses regarding wildlife viability.”).
51
SeeMotor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State FarmMut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
52
Id.; see also McNair, 537 F.3d at 1002 (holding that the Forest Service
“did not fail to conduct a ‘full and fair discussion’ as NEPA requires” even when
the agency failed to discuss two articles brought to the agency’s attention by the
plaintiff because “they did not raise uncertainties about its methodology.”).
53
See Comm. to Pres. Boomer Lake Park v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 4 F.3d
1543, 1556 (10th Cir. 1993).
54
Richard N. Andrews L., Agency Responses to NEPA: A Comparison and
Implications, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 301, 302 (1976).
55
Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 870 F.2d 177, 199 (5th Cir.
1989) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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choice made,” a court cannot uphold an agency’s decision.
56
However, if an agency takes a “hard look at the environmental
consequences of the proposed action, the court will not second-
guess the wisdom of the ultimate decision.”
57
Additionally, “[t]he
APA does not allow the court to overturn an agency decision
because it disagrees with the decision or with the agency’s
conclusions about environmental impacts.”
58
The hard look doctrine has been applied to NEPA to ensure that
each agency reviews the relevant environmental consequences when
conducting a major federal action.
59
The test began applying to
environmental law in the early 1970s, as articulated in Natural
Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,
60
which held that, “[s]o
long as the officials and agencies have taken the ‘hard look’ at
environmental consequences mandated by Congress, the court does
not seek to impose unreasonable extremes or to interject itself within
the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action
to be taken.”
61
For the purposes of this Note, the court’s role begins
and ends on a determination of whether the agency took a hard look
at the proposed action’s environmental consequences.
62
After Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., the hard look test
developed for agencies to examine the critical question of what, if
56
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State FarmMut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
57
Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 305 F.3d 1152, 1163
(10th Cir. 2002); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t. of Interior, 623
F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the court’s role is to “ensure that the
agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of its proposed
action.” (citation omitted)).
58
River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir.
2010).
59
Am. Rivers v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 895 F.3d 32, 49 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
60
See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837–38 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (questioning the scope of NEPA as it applies to alternatives for oil and
gas facilities on a coastal marsh complex).
61
Id. at 838 (internal citations omitted).
62
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976) (quoting Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 458 F.2d at 838).
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any, anticipated effects a project will have on the environment,
63
requiring under NEPA that an agency “take a hard look at the
environmental consequences before taking a major action.”
64
Under
the updated hard look test, an agency’s EIS will pass only if a “well-
considered” and “fully informed” analysis took place;
65
however,
this is often seen as an “imprecise exercise.”
66
Once an agency has
taken a hard look at the potential environmental consequences of its
actions, the agency is then able to move forward with the action,
concluding that other interests outweigh the previously identified
environmental costs.
67
Attempts have been made to evolve the hard look test within the
NEPA context into a harder look test.
68
This was first seen in
Ecology Center, Inc. v. Austin, where the Ninth Circuit held that the
Forest Service, the federal agency in question, violated NEPA by
using a scientifically unverified hypothesis to conclude that the
thinning of an old-growth forest through commercial logging after a
fire was necessary for the forest and beneficial to the dependent
63
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 458 F.2d at 827; see Save Our Cumberland
Mountains v. Kempthorne, 453 F.3d 334, 341–42 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The company
in this instance responded to initial concerns that the agency raised about the
application, proposed measures to mitigate the near-term damage to the
environment and proposed measures designed to restore the environment to its
pre-mining state” and concluded that the short term consequences were minor and
the long-term impacts were minimal.).
64
Mayo v. Jarvis, 177 F. Supp. 3d 91, 107 (D.D.C. 2016) (internal quotations
omitted); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102 (42 U.S.C. § 4332)
(2017).
65
Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 783 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Nevada v. Dep’t of
Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
66
Am. Rivers v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 895 F.3d 32, 49 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
67
See, e.g., The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008),
overruled on other grounds byWinter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
22–23 (2008); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350
(1989); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
68
Amy Collier, Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell: A Hard Look at
Procedural Compliance under NEPA, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 527, 534 (2017).
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species that lived there.
69
The Forest Service argued that this
treatment was designed to leave most of the old-growth trees while
also improving their health, while the plaintiffs challenging the
action highlighted that this treatment was misleading and research
about it was incomplete.
70
The court found that the Forest Service
would have had to address, in a meaningful way, the scientific
uncertainties regarding the treatment of the forest.
71
This case was
overruled by The Lands Council v. McNair,
72
where the Ninth
Circuit found that Ecology Center
73
made three key errors: (1) that
the court read the holding of precedential case Lands Council v.
Powell
74
too broadly; (2) that the court in expecting the Forest
Service to address the scientific uncertainties “created a requirement
not found in any relevant statute or regulation;”
75
and (3) that the
court ignored well-established law regarding deference provided to
agencies and their methodological choices by not providing
deference to the Forest Service’s scientific analysis.
76
The court’s
ruling inMcNair
77
allows agencies to make environmental decisions
with poorly researched science and removes the courts’ role in
review of agency decisions.
78
The Ninth Circuit in McNair further
69
See Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1063–65 (9th Cir. 2005),
overruled by 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) (“NEPA requires consideration of the
potential impact of an action before the action takes place.” (internal quotations
and citation omitted)).
70
Id. at 1065.
71
Id.
72
The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
73
Ecology Ctr., Inc., 430 F.3d at 1065.
74
See Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
Final [EIS] should have provided adequate data of the time, type, place, and scale
of past timber harvests and should have explained in sufficient detail how
different project plans and harvest methods affected the environment. The Forest
Service did not do this, and NEPA requires otherwise.”).
75
McNair, 537 F.3d at 991.
76
See id. at 992 (“Were we to grant less deference to the agency, we would
be ignoring the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard of review.”).
77
Id.
78
See id. at 993 (“Essentially, we assessed the quality and detail of on-site
analysis and made ‘fine-grained judgments of its worth.’ It is not our proper role
to conduct such an assessment.”).
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explained Ecology Center’s
79
errors by stating that the holding in
Powell
80
did not require agencies to always verify the scientific
methodology employed in making an assessment of environmental
impacts and that the holding in Powell
81
was limited to the specific
facts of that case.
82
Lastly, the court inMcNair explained that if the
court were to “grant less deference to the agency, [the court] would
be ignoring the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard of review”
and would instead place substantial requirements on the agency not
imposed by NEPA.
83
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit in McNair found
that a court’s proper role in reviewing a federal agency’s decision
under NEPA is to ensure that the agency “made no ‘clear error of
judgment’ [in the creation of the agency’s EIS] that would render its
action ‘arbitrary and capricious.’”
84
McNair stopped the possibility
of a court requiring an agency to take a harder look becauseMcNair
found it was not the court’s role to assess the detail and quality of
the relevant science.
85
In 2014, the CEQ clarified the hard look test in a Memorandum
for the Heads of Federal Departments and Agencies.
86
This
Memorandum stated that an EIS “should contain sufficient
discussion of the relevant issues and opposing viewpoints to enable
the decisionmaker to take a ‘hard look’ as the environmental effects
79
See Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1069–71 (9th Cir. 2005).
80
Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005).
81
Id.
82
See The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“Ecology Center even suggests that such an analysis must be on-site, meaning in
the location of the proposed action. There, we rejected the Forest Service’s
argument that its on-the-ground soil analysis was ‘sufficiently reliable because it
utilized data from areas with ecological characteristics similar to the proposed
harvest units.’” (citation omitted)).
83
See id. at 992–93.
84
Id. at 993 (quoting Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378
(1989)).
85
Id. at 992.
86
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF FEDERAL
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 32 (2014), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-
regulations-and-
guidance/Effective_Use_of_Programmatic_NEPA_Reviews_Final_Dec2014_se
archable.pdf.
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and make a reasoned choice among alternatives.”
87
This meant that
“[t]here should be enough detail to enable those who did not have a
part in its compilation to understand and meaningfully consider the
factors involved.”
88
A NEPA review that defers some decisions can
still be considered to have involved a hard look at the environmental
issues.
89
“NEPAmerely prohibits uninformed agency actions, rather
than unwise [ones];”
90
despite this, NEPA does not explain how
agencies are supposed to inform themselves.
91
That said, there are
other statutes that may impose substantive obligations on federal
agencies to review issues of disparate impact.
92
Thus, by the
combination of decisions like that in McNair
93
and the use of
statutes that impose substantive obligations on federal agencies,
94
a
harder look test can be created that would help bolster the goals of
NEPA by providing minimum benchmarks. Not only would this
provide a stricter standard that would comply with NEPA’s intent,
but it would also help ensure the environmental justice of low-
income and minority communities.
95
II. APPLICATIONS OF THEHARDER LOOK TEST IN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW
Despite The Lands Council v. McNair’s
96
overruling Ecology
Center, Inc. v. Austin,
97
some courts have continued an attempt to
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See id. at 33.
90
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989)
(emphasis added).
91
Andrews L., supra note 54.
92
Robertson, 490 U.S. at 351.
93
The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2008).
94
See ElizabethM. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination
Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 557 (2010) (“Substantive decisions can be
‘disguised as process’ and process decisions can operate as a proxy for substantive
impacts.”).
95
See infra Part I.
96
McNair, 537 F.3d at 990.
97
Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005).
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articulate a harder look test by stating the amount and type of
information used within an EIS to be examined by a court.
98
To
illustrate, the federal agency challenged in Oregon Natural Desert
Association v. Jewell
99
planned to create a wind energy facility on a
privately-owned tract which housed a large sage grouse
100
population that had seen a population decline from forty-five
percent to eighty percent since 1950, largely due to habitat loss.
101
The agency assumed the birds would migrate away from the subject
territory during the winter and analyzed the project prospectively
with respect to the absence of the birds. However, the court in
Oregon Natural Desert Association found that some birds did not
migrate and that the agency should have conducted its analysis using
the presence of birds rather than basing the analysis on the
assumption that the birds would migrate.
102
Therefore, the court
found the agency’s decision, as based on its final EIS, to be arbitrary
and capricious because no surveys were conducted prior to the
beginning of the project to determine if the grouse would be present
at the project site during the time at issue.
103
Similarly, the agency
in Great Basin Resource Watch v. Bureau of Land Management
approved a project planning to build facilities on public land despite
concerns regarding the analysis of air impacts, water quality
impacts, and funding aspects brought to light by plaintiffs and the
Environmental Protection Agency.
104
The Ninth Circuit in Great
Basin Reservation Watch found that the agency violated NEPA
because, in the process of assessing the environment’s baseline
98
Great Basin Res. Watch v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 844 F.3d 1095, 1099–
1100 (9th Cir. 2016); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n. v. Jewell, 840 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir.
2016); Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.
Cir. 2016); FELDMAN&NICHOLS, supra note 48, at 6- 6.
99
Jewell, 840 F.3d at 566.
100
A large sage grouse is a species of bird found in the western United States.
Guide to North American Birds, NAT’L AUDUBON SOC’Y,
https://www.audubon.org/field-guide/bird/greater-sage-grouse (last visited Aug.
26, 2019).
101
Jewell, 840 F.3d at 566.
102
Id. at 569.
103
Id. at 570.
104
Great Basin Res. Watch v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 844 F.3d 1095, 1099–
1100 (9th Cir. 2016).
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conditions for purposes of the EIS, the bureau assumed baseline-
zero pollutants and provided no support for its assumption
whatsoever, rendering its analysis inadequate for purposes of an
EIS, as NEPA calls for the public to be informed regarding the
“underlying environmental data from which a [reviewing agency]
expert derived her opinion.”
105
While NEPA provides deference to agencies, the court in Jewell
stated that, “when undertaking scientific or technical
analysis[,] . . . deference does not excuse the [agency] from
ensuring the accuracy and scientific integrity of its analysis . . . .
[A]ny such extrapolation must be based on accurate information and
defensible reasoning.”
106
The Ninth Circuit inGreat Basin Resource
Watch took this a step further by stating that the agency’s discussion
of cumulative impacts to other resources within the EIS did not
comply with NEPA because it did not “quantify or discuss in any
detail the effects of other activities” beyond the mining project at
issue, like oil and gas development, that would aggregately impact
the subject environment’s health.
107
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility v. Hopper held
that the agency, in its EIS, failed its duty to take a hard look at every
significant aspect of the potential environmental impacts of adding
additional off-shore windmills because the agency inadequately
considered the predictable consequences of its project when it relied
on geophysical and geotechnical surveys that did not include
105
See id. at 1103 (“We might reach a different conclusion had the NDEP
official explained why an estimate of zero was appropriate, or had the BLM
independently scrutinized that estimate and decided that it was reasonable, and
then explained why.”); see also Save Our Cabinets v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 254
F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1266–67 (D. Mont. 2017), judgment entered, No. CV 16-53-M
(DWM), 2017 WL 2829681 (D. Mont. June 29, 2017), dismissed sub nom
(“Because the agency’s choice did not rest on inaccurate information or
indefensible reasoning, the use of data from the Little Cherry Creek site was not
arbitrary and capricious.”).
106
Jewell, 840 F.3d at 570.
107
See Bureau of Land Mgmt., 844 F.3d at 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding
that “[t]he cumulative air impacts portion of the [final EIS] fails to ‘enumerate the
environmental effects of [other] projects’ or ‘consider the interaction of multiple
activities.’” (quoting Or. Nat. Res. Council Fund v. Brong, 492 F.3d 1120, 1133
(9th Cir. 2007)).
THE HARD LOOK DOCTRINE 335
sufficient data with regard to the affected seafloor.
108
Therefore,
agency deference does not imply complete deference as agencies are
still required to ensure some amount of scientific accuracy, or, at
least, process.
109
In fact, courts have found that there are instances where little to
no deference to an agency is warranted.
110
The court in Resource
Investments, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers found that no
deference is warranted when the agency’s actions are wholly
unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.
111
Limited deference may be warranted if an agency’s interpretation of
a rule or regulation conflicts with that agency’s prior interpretation
of that rule or regulation.
112
Lastly, the court inMonex International,
Ltd. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission found that “judicial
deference is not necessarily warranted where courts have experience
in the area and are fully competent to decide the issue.”
113
Therefore,
a court need not always defer to an agency in its determination of
environmental impacts of a proposed plan, as the environmental
analysis must maintain scientific integrity, accuracy, and must be
followed with reasonable decisions based off the information
available.
114
If a court does not need to defer completely to an
agency decision, it may be able to compel additional procedural
108
Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1083
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
109
Jewell, 840 F.3d at 570.
110
See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–28 (2001)
(explaining a continuum of deference owed); see also Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291
F.3d 1123, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining differing levels of deference).
111
Resources Invs., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 151 F.3d 1162, 1165
(9th Cir. 1998); see also Cmty. Hosp. of Monterey Peninsula v. Thompson, 323
F.3d 782, 791 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that when an agency has to interpret a
policy statement, it is given less deference by the courts).
112
See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917,
928, 933 (9th Cir. 2008); Young v. Reno, 114 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 1997).
113
Monex Int’l, Ltd. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 83 F.3d 1130,
1133 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
114
Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
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requirements under NEPA that will substantively affect the agency’s
decision.
115
III. PREVIOUSAPPLICATIONS OFDISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Low income and minority groups have, for years, suffered
disparate environmental impacts.
116
As a result, regulations were
created through Title VI to ensure that programs that receive federal
financial assistance are not conducted in ways that discriminate
against individuals on the basis of race, color, or national origin.
117
Congress has allowed disparate impact challenges to proceed based
solely on proof of discriminatory impact so that discriminatory
practices can be fairly challenged in court, as discriminatory motives
are often near-impossible to affirmatively prove.
118
However, applying the disparate impact theory to environmental
issues is more complex than the traditional employment contexts in
which it often arises because courts require a control group for
purposes of comparison, and “different disparate impacts may be
revealed depending on what control population is arbitrarily selected
for comparison.”
119
Furthermore, it is possible that federal agencies
may actually intend to pursue projects in low-income and minority
communities in order to bring aggregate benefits, despite the
environmental impacts (for example, public transit projects may
intend to provide greater access to poor neighborhoods which often
have fewer family cars); disparate impact analysis would fall apart,
as there would actually be a disparate impact to white and wealthy
115
See Schneider, supra note 94, at 557 (“Substantive decisions can be
‘disguised as process’ and process decisions can operate as a proxy for substantive
impacts.” (citation omitted)).
116
See Jim Erickson, Targeting Minority, Low-Income Neighborhoods for
Hazardous Waste Sites, U. MICH. NEWS (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://news.umich.edu/targeting-minority-low-income-neighborhoods-for-
hazardous-waste-sites/.
117
Title VI Legal Manual: Section VII: Proving Discrimination – Disparate
Impact, DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/T6Manual7#I (last
updated Feb. 10, 2017).
118
Id.
119
Michael W. Steinberg, Making Sense of Environmental Justice, 15
FORUM FORAPPLIED RES. & PUB. POLICY 82, 84 (2000).
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communities.
120
Nevertheless, by having judges act as statisticians
in the review of an agency’s EIS, disparate impact theory can
prohibit facially neutral practices that create discriminatory
effects.
121
Noting these inherent difficulties in the environmental law
context, courts have narrowed the grounds on which plaintiffs can
bring claims for discrimination in environmental suits and have
determined that plaintiffs are required to prove discriminatory
intent.
122
However, discriminatory intent is extremely difficult for
plaintiffs to prove: not only are officials unlikely to memorialize
discriminatory intent, but intent to discriminate, especially on the
scale of a federal agency, usually stems from multiple acts and
actors as well as historical and political systems and structures.
123
Rather than filing suits under Title VI, environmental justice
120
Id.
121
See Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact
Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 778–79 (2009) (discussing judges’ use of
statistics in cases involving disparate impact theory); see also John Ruple &Mark
Capone, NEPA—Substantive Effectiveness Under a Procedural Mandate:
Assessment of Oil and Gas EISs in the Mountain West, 7 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY
& ENVTL. L.J. 39, 50 (2016) (“NEPA compliance does appear to produce final
decisions that are substantially less impactful on the environment when compared
to initially proposed projects.”).
122
See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 273 (2002) (announcing
a new test that appears to eliminate the possibility that plaintiffs could use 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce these disparate impact regulations); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001) (holding agency regulations interpreting Title
VI to prohibit programs that give rise to mere discriminatory effects are not
enforceable by a private right of action).
123
See Tseming Yang, The Form and Substance of Environmental Justice:
The Challenge of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for Environmental
Regulation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 143, 156 (2002);
[T]he discriminatory intent requirement is premised on the
existence of a particular, identifiable bigoted actor or a bigoted
act that can be blamed for the discriminatory result. The
requirement purposefully ignores the fact that discriminatory
outcomes are frequently the result of processes that cannot be
traced to any specific actor or act, but are instead the result of
institutions and processes that are biased against racial
minorities.
Id.
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communities have begun to file administrative complaints with the
EPA’s External Civil Rights Compliance Office (“ECRCO”).
124
However, according to an evaluation of ECRCO by the Center for
Public Integrity, the “office hadn’t made a formal finding of
discrimination in [twenty-two] years, despite having received
hundreds of complaints.”
125
While ECRCO has rejected complaints
for procedural reasons, such as being outside of ECRCO’s
jurisdiction, the agency’s inaction is, in essence, a denial of
discrimination, or at the very least a hindrance to its remedy.
126
Neither disparate impact claims nor administrative complaints
filed with ECRCO have prevailed in discrimination suits because of
the ways courts narrowly construe Title VI in the environmental law
context and because of ECRCO’s procedural delays.
127
It is possible
to include a disparate impact analysis within the NEPA process
124
Albert Huang, Environmental Justice and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act:
A Critical Crossroads, AM. BAR ASS’N (2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/trends/2011_12/march_april/environ
mental_justice_title_vi_civil_rights_act/. The External Civil Rights Compliance
Office (“ECRCO”) was known as the Office of Civil Rights before December
2016. External Civil Rights Compliance Office (Title VI), supra note 11.
125
Talia Buford, EPAWorks to Remake Troubled Office of Civil Rights, CTR.
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2017/01/20/20604/epa-works-remake-troubled-
office-civil-rights.
126
Kristen Lombardi et al., Environmental Racism Persists, and the EPA Is
One Reason Why, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 4, 2015),
https://publicintegrity.org/environment/environmental-racism-persists-and-the-
epa-is-one-reason-why/; see also Rosemere Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 581 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[D]iscovery has shown that
the EPA failed to process a single complaint from 2006 or 2007 in accordance
with its regulatory deadlines.”); Californians for Renewable Energy v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, No. C 15-3292 (SBA), 2018 WL 1586211, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
30, 2018) (“It is well documented that the EPA has been sued repeatedly for
failing to investigate Title VI complaints in a timely manner.”).
127
See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001); Rosemere
Neighborhood Ass’n, 581 F.3d at 1175 (The court found that the “‘isolated
instance of untimeliness’ has since bloomed into a consistent pattern of delay by
the EPA. [The Plaintiff] has twice encountered that pattern whereby it files a
complaint, hears nothing for months, and then only after filing a lawsuit does the
EPA respond.”); Californians for Renewable Energy, 2018 WL 1586211, at *15
(“The EPA often takes years to act on a complaint—and even then, acts only after
a lawsuit has been filed.”).
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because agencies are required to “[r]igorously explore and
objectively evaluate” impacts that will be regulated further under
environmental laws.
128
Therefore, to guarantee that discrimination
is taken into consideration as intended by Executive Order 12898,
courts must hold agencies accountable throughout the NEPA
process by ensuring agencies use a disparate impact analysis
129
premised on discriminatory impact when making environmental
decisions.
IV. AGENCIES SHOULD INCLUDE ADISPARATE IMPACTREPORT IN
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS TOBOLSTERDATA
AND SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY
There is a basic distinction between challenging the adequacy of
an EIS and challenging the promulgating agency’s decision on its
merits; the factors discussed below are procedural issues critical to
the success of the adequacy of an EIS rather than its merits.
130
While
it may seem that the decision in The Lands Council v. McNair
rendered a harder look test no longer viable because it found it was
not the court’s role to determine the scientific quality used when
forming an EIS,
131
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council
found that a court’s proper role is controlled by the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard under section 706(2)(A) of the APA.
132
Despite
McNair,
133
courts in the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere have continued
to articulate a “harder look” standard that requires agencies to
provide quality and current science, and they have explored how
agencies should discuss elements of EISs including data sufficiency,
data gaps, stale data, and the scientific integrity of models and
128
Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2018).
129
Title VI Legal Manual: Section VII: Proving Discrimination – Disparate
Impact, supra note 117.
130
See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 333
(1989) (“[I]t is well settled that NEPA itself does not impose substantive duties
mandating particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process for
preventing uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.”).
131
The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2008).
132
Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376 (1989).
133
See McNair, 537 F.3d at 992.
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methodologies used in the creation of impact statements.
134
To
remedy the disproportionate harms that federal agency projects have
on low-income and minority communities, courts need to modify
the hard look doctrine with the disparate impact theory under Title
VI. This way, facially neutral environmental policies may be
considered discriminatory because of their disparate effects,
regardless of underlying intent.
The court in Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility
v. Hopper found that the EIS conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management failed to take a “hard look” at the proposed
project’s environmental impact because the agency’s initial decision
to offer a lease for the construction of new off-shore windmills did
not include any additional geophysical surveys that would review
the consequences of the action.
135
The D.C. Circuit in Hopper held
that, while a federal agency is not required to be “clairvoyant,” it
must “consider the predictable consequences of [its] decision.”
136
Building on Hopper, the D.C. Circuit in Ogala Sioux Tribe v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission noted that the following
environmental effects must be assessed: “aesthetic, historic,
cultural, economic, social, [and] health.”
137
Yet, both before and
after McNair,
138
courts and the CEQ have remained silent as to
exactly how agencies are supposed to assess this information.
139
The
court in McNair specifically stated that there is “no legal basis” to
require an agency to conduct any specific type of test to better
understand the environmental consequences of a proposed
134
FELDMAN & NICHOLS, supra note 48; see, e.g., Great Basin Res. Watch
v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 844 F.3d 1095, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2016); Or. Nat.
Desert Ass’n v. Jewell, 840 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 2016); Pub. Emps. for Envtl.
Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
135
Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility, 827 F.3d at 1083.
136
Id.
137
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 896 F.3d 520,
530 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b)
(2018)).
138
The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2008).
139
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 86, at n.44; see, e.g., Sierra
Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2017);
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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project.
140
While McNair frames this as a substantive requirement
which “cannot be derived from the procedural parameters of
NEPA,”
141
a court cannot adequately assess whether an agency has
considered “accurate information and defensible reasoning” without
direction.
142
Including an analysis in the EIS regarding the disparate
impacts of a proposed project would be effective in showing
agencies the potential consequences stemming from their
environmental decisions because they would have statistical
evidence regarding how their actions would affect communities in
disproportionate ways.
143
A court’s deference to agency decision-making can have grave
consequences when viewed through a disparate impact lens,
especially considering that courts rely on an agency’s determination
when there is a “high level of technical expertise” involved, and they
will be “most deferential” when reviewing scientific judgments and
technical analyses within the “agency’s expertise.”
144
However, a
determination of how a particular scientific judgment or technical
analysis affects the civil rights of low-income and minority groups
is not the same as an analysis of the science and technical skill that
agencies use when making their decisions.
145
While McNair found
that the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard of review would be
effectively passed over if agencies were no longer privileged by a
court’s deference,
146
a disparate impact claim is not reviewed by the
140
See McNair, 537 F.3d at 992.
141
Id. (citation omitted).
142
Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Jewell, 840 F.3d 562, 570 (9th Cir. 2016).
143
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2017); 42 U.S.C. §
3604 (2018).
144
McNair, 537 F.3d at 993–94.
145
See League of Wild. Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Connaughton, 752 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In some contexts, NEPA’s
‘hard look’ standard requires agencies to conduct new scientific studies in order
to ‘full[y] and fair[ly]’ analyze the impacts of a particular project.” (citation
omitted)); cf. Latin Ams. for Soc. & Econ. Dev. v. Adm’r of Fed. Highway
Admin., 858 F. Supp. 2d 839, 861 (E.D. Mich. 2012), aff’d, 756 F.3d 447 (6th
Cir. 2014) (finding that the administrator’s highway construction plan, which
disproportionately affected low-income and minority communities, was not
arbitrary and capricious because alternatives were considered and a mitigation
plan was established).
146
McNair, 537 F.3d at 992.
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arbitrary and capricious standard, and courts have determined
disparate impact cases without deferring to agencies.
147
However, as
seen in Hopper, courts have the power to require agencies to use
sufficient data, fill data gaps, not use stale data, and ensure the
scientific integrity of models and methodologies.
148
Therefore,
courts can, and should, use a disparate impact analysis to determine
what qualifies as proper data and scientific integrity for an agency’s
EIS.
A. Sufficient Data
The Supreme Court in Alexander v. Sandoval closed the window
for private individuals to bring environmental justice claims
pursuant to Title VI, and by extension disparate impact claims,
because the Court found that Congress only intended Title VI to
include a private remedy.
149
However, under NEPA, agencies are
still required to determine how to properly consider “accurate
information and defensible reasoning” within an EIS to not be
considered arbitrary or capricious.
150
As Rachael Moshman and
John Hardenbergh discuss in The Color of Katrina: A Proposal to
Allow Disparate Impact Environmental Claims, to apply a disparate
impact theory to environmental issues, courts would need to meet
147
See also Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005) (finding that
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act authorized recovery for disparate
impact claims, declining to follow the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the
Act); Jones v. City of Bos., 752 F.3d 38, 52 (1st Cir. 2014) (“The [agency’s] rule
itself has some practical utility. There is simply nothing in that utility, however,
to justify affording decisive weight to the rule to negate or establish proof of
disparate impact in a Title VII case.”).
148
Great Basin Res. Watch v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 844 F.3d 1095, 1105
(9th Cir. 2016); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Jewell, 840 F.3d 562, 570 (9th Cir. 2016);
Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
149
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275–76 (2001).
150
Jewell, 840 F.3d at 570; accord Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 333 (1989) (“[I]t is well settled that NEPA itself does not
impose substantive duties mandating particular results, but simply prescribes the
necessary process for preventing uninformed—rather than unwise—agency
action.”).
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threshold requirements.
151
First, a court should determine if a major
federal action had a disparate adverse impact on a racial minority or
low-income community.
152
Second, it should be determined whether
the person(s) affected is a member of the racial minority group or
low-income community affected.
153
If these two elements are
proven, the burden should shift to the federal agency to prove that
“the decision was justified by environmental necessity or other
compelling governmental interest.”
154
If a court were to consistently review an EIS for disparate
adverse impacts, agencies would, in turn, be required to put the
disparate impact-relevant information within the EIS such that the
EIS would not be considered arbitrary or capricious.
155
Agencies
would determine whether major federal actions have a disparate
adverse impact on a racial minority or low-income community.
156
Then, if the EIS were challenged, a court would review for scientific
accuracy and reasonable sources.
157
When plaintiffs seek
preliminary injunctive relief, as typical in a NEPA case,
158
courts
should conduct a balancing test—and considering that there is no
adequate remedy at law, the balance of equities favors the moving
party and the public interest.
159
However, NEPA does not specify as
to how such considerations should be pursued, as there are concerns
that issues related to disparate impact additions would be considered
substantive rather than procedural.
160
151
Rachael Moshman & John Hardenbergh, The Color of Katrina: A
Proposal to AllowDisparate Impact Environmental Claims, 6 SUSTAINABLEDEV.
L. & POL’Y 15, 15–16 (2006).
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 16.
157
Id.
158
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155, 157 (2010).
159
Crutchfield v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 192 F. Supp. 2d 444, 456 (E.D.
Va. 2001).
160
See League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Connaughton, 752 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In some contexts, NEPA’s
‘hard look’ standard requires agencies to conduct new scientific studies in order
to ‘full[y] and fair[ly]’ analyze the impacts of a particular project.” (citation
omitted)).
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To integrate a disparate impact theory into the planning and
review of federal agency projects, agencies and reviewing courts
would need to determine the need for statistical evidence and review
the relevant comparator population.
161
The legally relevant
population base refers to the “persons subject to the
challenged . . . practice.”
162
Agencies and reviewing courts should
begin their review of the EIS by asking whether projects are
environmentally appropriate with regard to “the subset of the
population that is affected by the disputed decision.”
163
This is
because the ultimate issue is “whether the policy has a
discriminatory effect within the population it affects,” an analysis
which ideally would include comparison groups, but those that do
not extend beyond the total impacted group.
164
This would likely
fulfill the President’s intent expressed through Executive Order
12898
165
because agencies would take environmental justice into
greater consideration.
Next, to complete the agency’s EIS review, courts should
confirm whether those who are disparately adversely affected
belong to a racial minority group or low-income community. In
order to do so, courts could follow the Department of Justice’s
suggestion that, “[w]hen, and only when, an agency can reasonably
conclude that everyone in the jurisdiction is potentially affected,
investigating agencies can rely on . . . disparate impact cases to
support using an entire jurisdiction as the relevant population
base.”
166
The Supreme Court has clarified that federal agencies have
significant discretion when determining disparate impact
161
Title VI Legal Manual: Section VII: Proving Discrimination – Disparate
Impact, supra note 117.
162
Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1196 (10th Cir. 2006).
163
Hous. Inv’rs, Inc. v. City of Clanton, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1299 (M.D.
Ala. 1999).
164
Title VI Legal Manual: Section VII: Proving Discrimination – Disparate
Impact, supra note 117.
165
Exec. Order No. 12,898, supra note 4.
166
While agencies and reviewing courts could use general population data to
understand the make-up of the communities affected, courts have rejected using
this type of data when the disparate impact claim challenges a more focused
policy. Title VI Legal Manual: Section VII: Proving Discrimination – Disparate
Impact, supra note 117.
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standards.
167
Therefore, by reviewing an EIS with a disparate impact
analysis, agencies would have a clearer understanding of what is
required of them, provide fuller data to the public, and make better-
informed project decisions.
B. Data Gaps
When evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse
effects in projects in the context of an EIS, agencies must address
incomplete or insufficient information.
168
Courts often apply a “rule
of reason” and decline to second-guess an agency’s choice to omit
information when an agency omits non-essential information in an
EIS.
169
If impacts are uncertain, information is lacking, and the
agency discusses potential mitigation measures, then courts will still
uphold an agency’s NEPA analysis.
170
However, when an agency
incorrectly concludes that data is not relevant to its NEPA analysis,
then courts have found that the agency action may be set aside.
171
Additionally, courts have gone further to state that agencies violate
NEPAwhen they fail to disclose relevant incomplete information.
172
Including a disparate impact reporting requirement for agencies
within NEPA would provide greater clarity to decisionmakers
considering federal agency projects and to reviewing courts.
Through the use of statistical significance tests, agencies can avoid
falling back on a claim of insufficient information as such tests can
167
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293–94 (1985) (“Title VI had
delegated to the agencies in the first instance the complex determination of what
sorts of disparate impact upon minorities constituted sufficiently significant social
problems, and were readily enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices
of the federal grantees that had produced those impacts.”).
168
Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2018).
169
Webster v. Dep’t of Agric., 685 F.3d 411, 425–26 (4th Cir. 2012); see
also Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 673 F.3d 518, 531 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[C]ompliance with § 1502.22 is subject to the ‘rule of reason.’” (quoting. §
1502.22(b))).
170
See Backcountry Against Dumps v. Jewell, 674 F. App’x 657, 661 (9th
Cir. 2017); Okanogan Highlands All. v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 477 (9th Cir.
2000).
171
Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. McAllister, 666 F.3d 549, 554–55 (9th Cir.
2011).
172
Id. at 559–60.
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show disparate impact.
173
When conducting a test of statistical
significance concerning disparate impact, researchers “commonly
use the ninety-five percent confidence level, which is also termed
the five percent (0.05) level of significance.”
174
A statistical
significance test allows a court to determine with sufficient
confidence that an adversely affected party was disparately
discriminated against because the court can be ninety-five percent
certain that a disparity in the pool reflects a real disparity in
practice.
175
While a statistical significance test does not provide
practical significance,
176
disparate impact analysis includes an
additional test—the four-fifths test
177
—which can determine
whether a disparity is sufficiently large and critical to show disparate
impact of a federal project.
178
Furthermore, if plaintiffs can explain
the significance of missing information within an EIS, and the
consequentiality of the omission were to be readily available to the
reviewing court, the “rule of reason” may no longer apply.
179
Therefore, if agencies include disparate impact analyses and courts
review such analyses, courts would address concerns regarding
insufficient data because disparate impact can be evaluated to a
statistically significant degree.
Data gaps also may refer to missing discussions regarding
“natural resources” as well as “cultural, economic, social, or health”
173
Peresie, supra note 121, at 785.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 786.
176
Statistical significance quantifies if a result is likely due to chance while
practical significance looks at whether the difference is large enough to be
important for businesses. Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Statistical Significance,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/02/a-refresher-on-
statistical-significance.
177
The four-fifths rule explains that:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less
than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group
with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal
enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a
greater than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by
Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact.
Judicial Administration, 28 C.F.R. § 50.14(4)(D) (2019).
178
Peresie, supra note 121, at 777–78.
179
Webster v. Dep’t of Agric., 685 F.3d 411, 426 (4th Cir. 2012).
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effects as required by NEPA.
180
Often times it is rather unclear how
human actions (and thus agency proposals) will affect the human
environment.
181
Disparate impact theory allows for data gaps and
uses statistical analysis “administered in a scientifically reliable
manner by experts without attorney involvement.”
182
However,
there is no one rule that combats missing information in disparate
impact cases, as judges have dealt with data gaps on a case-by-case
basis.
183
The American Bar Association recommends that the best
way to deal with missing data for disparate impact cases is:
to determine how important the missing data is likely
to be, how defensible the use of a proxy would be,
whether underlying paper information is likely to be
reasonably complete and, if not, is likely not to be
systematically skewed, and the cost of inputting the
data from the paper records.
184
Therefore, just as disparate impact theory creates ways to address
data gaps, it can supplement an agency’s EA and EIS so that low-
income and minority communities can be considered, as can be the
effects projects have on them specifically.
C. Stale Data
The Ninth Circuit has previously stated that using non-current
scientific data is not a NEPA violation when there is no relevant
180
Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2018).
181
Brian Palmer, Determining the Environmental Impact of a Product is a
Complex Process, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/determining-the-
environmental-impact-of-a-product-is-a-complex-
process/2012/02/07/gIQA0APSeR_story.html?utm_term=.ba195dc1e5ff.
182
MICHAEL D. LIEDER, HOT ISSUES CONCERNING USE OF STATISTICAL
EVIDENCE INEMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINATIONCLASSACTIONLITIGATION 7 (2009)
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meeting
s/2009/ac2009/103.pdf.
183
Id.; see also Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 365–66 (2d Cir. 1999),
overruled on unrelated grounds by Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 461
F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2006) (Courts have considered and used both the four-
fifths rule and standard deviation calculations to determine whether a disparate
impact calculation’s results are sufficient to establish disparate impact.).
184
LIEDER, supra note 182.
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recent scientific data.
185
However, the Ninth Circuit has noted that
reliance on stale or outdated data is considered arbitrary and
capricious, even when there is no relevant recent scientific data.
186
Therefore, an agency can violate NEPA when it “fail[s] to properly
update the data with additional studies and surveys.”
187
The statistical significance test in a disparate impact theory
context would still be subject to stale or outdated statistics,
188
but
this does not mean that the test would automatically be excluded
from use. Understanding how the data is analyzed and “apply[ing]
that information to prevent cognitive mistakes” could resolve this
uncertainty.
189
Courts are well versed in applying statistical
significance tests to disparate impact theory claims in civil rights
contexts; transferring that process to an environmental claim would
not only be simple, but just.
190
Additionally, under the Obama Administration, a working group
was created to examine how Big Data
191
would be able to solve
discrimination regarding access to credit, higher education,
employment, and criminal justice.
192
The working group identified
outdated information for civil rights issues within those four
areas.
193
“The decision to use certain inputs and not others can result
185
League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Connaughton, 752 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014).
186
N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1085–
86 (9th Cir. 2011).
187
Id. at 1086.
188
Jeff Leek et al., Five Ways to Fix Statistics, NATURE (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-017-07522-z.
189
Id.
190
Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1999); Strand v.
Interlachen Country Club, No. C0-01-1826 (HSC), 2002 WL 1365637, at *6–7
(Minn. Ct. App. June 25, 2002); Kohn v. City of Minneapolis Fire Dep’t, 583
N.W.2d 7, 13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
191
Big Data refers to large data sets that are analyzed to reveal patterns or
trends, often relating to human behavior. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG
DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS, OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS
8 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/2016_0504_data_discrimination.pdf.
192
Id. at 10.
193
Id.
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in discriminatory outputs,”
194
and such is particularly true regarding
access to high environmental standards such as clean air.
195
Use of
Big Data (as suggested by the working group) compiled with the
public outreach portion of NEPA would likely help resolve issues
with stale or outdated data.
196
D. Scientific Integrity of Models and Methodologies
When conducting an EIS, agencies have a “duty to ensure the
‘scientific integrity’ of the []EIS’s discussions and analysis.”
197
Agencies must identify the methodologies used along with the
sources relied on for conclusions in an EIS.
198
While courts are
unlikely to overturn agency decisions, they do scrutinize the
technical aspects of their scientific integrity and methodology.
199
Courts are deferential to an agency’s choices as long as the agency
shows it has performed a “requisite investigation” of the proposed
environmental impact.
200
A “requisite investigation” is interpreted
194
Id.
195
See ALEX KARNER ET AL., TRANSPORTATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: HISTORY AND EMERGING PRACTICE 8 (2017),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325540110_Transportation_and_Envir
onmental_Justice_History_and_Emerging_Practice.
196
See id.;
A promising way forward can be found in emerging
community-based responses to environmental injustice that are
founded on the principle of achieving meaningful public
participation in the transportation planning process
. . . . Although this type of meaningful participation is not a
panacea for all transportation injustice . . . it has generated
promising and concrete wins in several planning processes and
related to specific projects.
Id.
197
Save the Peaks Coal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 669 F.3d 1025, 1037–38 (9th
Cir. 2015).
198
Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (2018).
199
Native Ecosystems Council v. Weldon, 697 F.3d 1043, 1049–50 (9th Cir.
2012); N. Plains Res. Council, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 668 F.3d 1067, 1080
(9th Cir. 2011); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th
Cir. 2010).
200
Native Ecosystems Council, 697 F.3d at 1052; N. Plains Res. Council,
668 F.3d at 1080; Greater Yellowstone Coal., 628 F.3d at 1150.
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as conducting a “thorough review of extensive modeling studies”
and “ask[ing] an outside consultant to evaluate [the critic’s]
concerns.”
201
Conversely, agencies violate NEPA if they fail to
discuss the relevant shortcomings of the selected methodology in the
analysis.
202
Using a disparate impact theory would require agencies and
reviewing courts to look at environmental discrimination through a
statistical significance test.
203
This would allow agencies and courts
to adequately address the adverse disparate impact of low-income
and minority communities
204
while maintaining the “professional
integrity” necessary for compliance with NEPA.
205
While it has
been argued that statistical significance tests are no longer as
relevant as they once were,
206
statistical significance tests are
“useful . . . when [the] effects are large and [can] vary little under
the conditions being studied.”
207
The disparate impact on low-
income or minority communities caused by federal programs can be
very large and may not vary drastically.
208
Additionally, courts and
agencies still use statistical significance tests to assist in the
determination of both environmental claims
209
and disparate impact
201
See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 628 F.3d at 1150.
202
Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489, 503 (9th Cir. 2014);
see also Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the agency’s EA was sufficient because the discussion of climate
change in terms of percentages was adequate to show greenhouse gas effects,
despite not being specific to the locale at issue, because climate change is a global
issue).
203
Supra Section IV.B.
204
Peresie, supra note 121, at 777.
205
Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (2018).
206
How Significant is Statistical Significance?, ENAGO ACAD.
https://www.enago.com/academy/how-significant-is-statistical-significance/
(last updated May 21, 2018).
207
Leek et al., supra note 188.
208
Willie A. Gunn, Environmental Justice: Use of Race Conscious
Remedies, 22 OHION.U. L. REV. 1315, 1321 (1996).
209
See San Juan Citizens Alliance v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 326 F.
Supp. 3d 1227, 1248 (D.N.M. 2018) (discussing statistical significance regarding
climate change).
THE HARD LOOK DOCTRINE 351
claims.
210
Therefore, if agencies and reviewing courts implement a
disparate impact theory into NEPA, the statistical significance test
would both be consistent with and maintain the scientific integrity
required by NEPA.
V. A HARDER LOOK TEST ISNOTBURDENSOME TOAGENCIES
BECAUSENEPA’SOBJECTIVE IS TO FOSTERCAREFUL AND
OPENAGENCYDECISION-MAKING
A modified “hard look” test will not create an inefficient or
excessively burdensome test for agencies during the NEPA
process.
211
Environmental law often creates the opportunity for
lengthy, bureaucratic, seemingly inefficient, and burdensome tests,
as seen with the Clean Water Act
212
and the Clean Air Act,
213
to
serve a critical end: protection against environmental hazards.
214
NEPA is no different. This, in part, is due to the fact that the original
objective of NEPA was to require more deliberate agency decision-
making and create more opportunities for public debate and
discussion in response to a concern that federal agencies failed to
take the time to consider appropriate alternatives to their
proposals.
215
“Thus, complaints about the delays produced by NEPA
may simply reflect disagreement with NEPA’s goal of fostering
210
See Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, No. 17-CV-01294
(RM) (NYW), 2018 WL 3093326, at *4–5 (D. Colo. June 22, 2018) (holding that
because plaintiffs failed to offer any statistically significant evidence, their
disparate impact claim failed).
211
The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]o
require the [agency] to affirmatively present every uncertainty in its EIS would be
an onerous requirement, given that experts in every scientific field routinely
disagree; such a requirement might inadvertently prevent the [agency] from acting
due to the burden it would impose.”).
212
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2017).
213
42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2017).
214
Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, The Tragic Flaw of the Clean Air Act,
REG. REV. (May 17, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/05/17/revesz-
lienke-tragic-flaw-clean-air-act/.
215
U.S. Cong. House. Committee on Resources: Oversight Hearing on
NEPA: Lessons Learned and Next Steps, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (statement of
Robert G. Dreher, Georgetown University Law Center).
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more careful, and more open, federal decision-making.”
216
Additionally, according to studies by the Federal Highway
Administration, environmental reviews take up a quarter of the total
time dedicated to completing a major highway project.
217
As such,
environmental reviews do not obstruct an agency from the
completion of a major federal action by causing delays or imposing
excessive cost.
218
Significant delays, though a subject of frequent
complaint, often come about because of funding deficits,
subordinated priority, and community disagreement, not necessarily
because of the time taken by environmental reviews.
219
The NEPA
process integrates a wide range of planning and review requirements
that may be seen as resulting in lengthy delays to the outside
observer, but there is no evidence that NEPA burdens agencies
beyond Congress’s original intention.
220
There is a perceived tension between environmental regulation
and competitive business,
221
but it is established that “well-designed
environmental regulation” can lead to more innovation and the
enhancement of competition.
222
While the definition of “well-
designed environmental regulation” is unclear, such regulation
ideally not only protects the environment, but also enhances profits
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
See Ledyard King, Back in Power, Democrats Want Answers on
Administration’s Environmental Decisions, USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/08/election-
results-2018-democrats-vow-rigorous-environmental-oversight/1918292002/
(“We want crystal clean water, we want beautiful perfect air . . . . At the same
time, we don’t want to put ourselves at a disadvantage to other countries who are
very competitive with us and who don’t abide by the rules at all.”).
222
STEFAN AMBEC ET AL., THE PORTER HYPOTHESIS AT 20: CAN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ENHANCE INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS?
3, 16 (2011), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-
DP-11-01.pdf.
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and competition by either improving the products of federal projects
themselves or the production process.
223
Furthermore, the issuance of Executive Order 12898 shows that
the federal government is concerned about environmental justice
issues, particularly by the creation of a working group intended to
provide guidance to federal agencies for “identifying
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects on minority populations and low-income populations.”
224
Additionally, in 1994, the Attorney General directed agency heads
to “ensure that the disparate impact provisions in . . . regulations are
fully utilized so that all persons may enjoy equally the benefits of
federally financed programs.”
225
The Attorney General further
stated that enforcement:
is an essential component of an effective civil rights
compliance program . . . . Frequently discrimination
results from policies and practices that are neutral on
their face but have the effect of discriminating[.]
Those policies and practices must be eliminated
unless they are shown to be necessary to the
program’s operation and there is no less
discriminatory alternative.
226
The Clinton Administration, after the issuance of Executive Order
12898, intended that disparate impact be used to require agencies to
review their facially neutral policies on their own, thereby requiring
courts to review plaintiff suits regarding agency decisions with
disparate impacts.
227
Lastly, disparate impact claims have generally
223
Id.; see Economics: Making it Profitable to Protect Nature, ENVTL. DEF.
FUND, https://www.edf.org/approach/markets (last visited Aug. 26, 2019) (noting
that creating incentives can make conservation of the environment profitable).
224
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority
Populations and Low-Income Populations, Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg.
7629 (Feb. 11, 1994), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,948, 60 Fed. Reg. 6381
(Jan. 30, 1995).
225
Memorandum For Heads of Departments and Agencies That Provide
Federal Financial Assistance, DEP’T JUSTICE (July 14, 1994),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/attorney-general-july-14-1994-
memorandum-use-disparate-impact-standard-administrative-regulations.
226
Id.
227
See id. (“This Administration will vigorously enforce Title VI. As part of
this effort, and to make certain that Title VI is not violated, each of you should
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been limited in scope,
228
and that would be no different if disparate
impact theory were incorporated into NEPA.
CONCLUSION
Disparate impact theory would provide both agencies planning
projects and reviewing courts with an understanding of how to
proceed in areas that NEPA does not explicitly explain by giving
additional information regarding data sufficiency, data gaps, stale
data, and the scientific integrity of models and methodologies. This
would not only offer an explanation as to how to conduct an EIS
under NEPA, but it would also pave clearer avenues to relief for
those in low-income or minority communities which are adversely
affected by environmental policy and regulations. Agencies would
be able to act on complete information with regard to low-income
and minority communities, no longer regretting decisions after
disparate impacts are understood but “too late to correct.”
229
While
there are concerns about the statistical tests used by disparate impact
theory, civil rights law requires that agencies following NEPA’s
hard look test consider environmental justice concerns. By including
a disparate impact standard when reviewing an EIS, the burden to
prove discriminatory conduct or policy would be placed on agencies
while maintaining the procedural aspect of NEPA’s regulations,
thereby creating a harder look test that places a greater emphasis on
the harms experienced by low-income and minority communities. It
is time to ensure the full implementation of Executive Order 12898
ensure that the disparate impact provisions in your regulations are fully utilized
so that all persons may enjoy equally the benefits of federally financed
programs.”).
228
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (“Disparate-impact liability mandates the
‘removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers,’ not the displacement
of valid governmental policies.” (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971))).
229
Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1216
(9th Cir. 1998) (“NEPA emphasizes the importance of coherent and
comprehensive up-front environmental analysis to ensure informed decision
making to the end that ‘the agency will not act on incomplete information, only
to regret its decision after it is too late to correct.’” (quoting Marsh v. Or. Nat.
Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989))).
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and protect minority and low-income communities from disparate
environmental impacts resulting from federal projects.
